

Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
Nielson, Daniel L. Tierney, Michael J. Lake, David A. Hawkins, Darren G.
Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
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Heftet
Leveringstid: 2-4 uker
Handlinger
Beskrivelse
Omtale
Why do governments increasingly delegate sovereign authority to international organizations and what are the consequences of such choices? This volume employs a broad range of empirical techniques to answer these questions and argues that the issues involved in controlling international bureaucracies are very similar to those faced in domestic politics.
Detaljer
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Utgivelsesdato:
14.09.2006
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ISBN/Varenr:
9780521680462
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Språk:
, Engelsk
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Forlag:
Cambridge University Press
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Fagtema:
Samfunn og samfunnsvitenskap
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Serie:
Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
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Litteraturtype:
-
Sider:
426
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Høyde:
22.7 cm
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Bredde:
15.1 cm

