Hopp til hovedinnhold
Omslagsbilde

Can Blockchain Solve the Hold-up Problem in Contracts?

Malani, Anup Holden, Richard

Produseres på bestilling

Leveringstid: 3-10 dager

Handlinger

Beskrivelse

Omtale

A vexing problem in contract law is modification. Two parties sign a contract but before they fully perform, they modify the contract. Should courts enforce the modified agreement? A private remedy is for the parties to write a contract that is robust to hold-up or that makes the facts relevant to modification verifiable. Provisions accomplishing these ends are renegotiation-design and revelation mechanisms. But implementing them requires commitment power. Conventional contract technologies to ensure commitment – liquidated damages – are disfavored by courts and themselves subject to renegotiation. Smart contracts written on blockchain ledgers offer a solution. We explain the basic economics and legal relevance of these technologies, and we argue that they can implement liquidated damages without courts. We address the hurdles courts may impose to use of smart contracts on blockchain and show that sophisticated parties' ex ante commitment to them may lead courts to allow their use as pre-commitment devices.

  • Utgivelsesdato:

    18.11.2021

  • ISBN/Varenr:

    9781009001397

  • Språk:

    Engelsk

  • Forlag:

    Cambridge University Press

  • Innbinding:

    Heftet

  • Fagtema:

    Samfunn og samfunnsvitenskap

  • Serie:

    Elements in Law, Economics and Politics

  • Litteraturtype:

    Faglitteratur

  • Sider:

    75

  • Høyde:

    15.2 cm

  • Bredde:

    22.8 cm

Corruption and the Voter's Decision : Experimental Evidence from Brazil

Corruption and the Voter's Decision : Experimental Evidence from Brazil

Figueiredo, Miguel F. P. de
9781009499767 Heftet
03.04.2025
Engelsk

Produseres på bestilling
U.S. Innovation Inequality and Trumpism : The Political Economy of Technology Deserts in a Knowledge Economy

U.S. Innovation Inequality and Trumpism : The Political Economy of Technology Deserts in a Knowledge Economy

Wittstock, Nicolas • Menaldo, Victor
9781009461467 Heftet
13.02.2025
Engelsk

Produseres på bestilling
More is Less : Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts

More is Less : Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts

Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija • Hart, Oliver
9781009396073 Heftet
23.05.2024
Engelsk

Produseres på bestilling
A Safety Valve Model of Equity as Anti-opportunism

A Safety Valve Model of Equity as Anti-opportunism

Friedman, Ezra • Ayotte, Kenneth • Smith, Henry E.
9781009217941 Heftet
07.09.2023
Engelsk

Produseres på bestilling
Reform for Sale : A Common Agency Model with Moral Hazard Frictions

Reform for Sale : A Common Agency Model with Moral Hazard Frictions

Martimort, David • Lefebvre, Perrin
9781009285582 Heftet
02.03.2023
Engelsk

Produseres på bestilling
Deep IV in Law : Appellate Decisions and Texts Impact Sentencing in Trial Courts

Deep IV in Law : Appellate Decisions and Texts Impact Sentencing in Trial Courts

Chen, Daniel L. • Huang, Zhe • Zhang, Xinyue • Wang, Ruofan
9781009296373 Heftet
25.08.2022
Engelsk

Produseres på bestilling
The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Behavior : A Comparative Perspective

The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Behavior : A Comparative Perspective

Weinshall, Keren • Epstein, Lee
9781009048859 Heftet
17.06.2021
Engelsk

Produseres på bestilling
Extending the Cure : Policy Responses to the Growing Threat of Antibiotic Resistance

Extending the Cure : Policy Responses to the Growing Threat of Antibiotic Resistance

Malani, Anup • Laxminarayan, Ramanan • Smith, David L. • Howard, David
9781138164383 Innbundet
20.04.2017
Engelsk

Produseres på bestilling
Extending the Cure : Policy Responses to the Growing Threat of Antibiotic Resistance

Extending the Cure : Policy Responses to the Growing Threat of Antibiotic Resistance

Malani, Anup • Laxminarayan, Ramanan • Smith, David L. • Howard, David
9781933115573 Heftet
17.05.2007
Engelsk

Produseres på bestilling